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Ethnomethodology as an unusual methods of studying society 
The scientific field of ethnomethodology is broad scope, unusual and interesting sphere. To begin 
with we should evaluate the main term. Ethnomethodology is a fairly recent sociological perspective, 
founded by the American sociologist Harold Garfinkel in 1954. The main ideas behind it are set out in his 
book "Studies in Ethnomethodology" (1967). Ethnomethodology simply means the study of the ways in 
which people make sense of their social world, display this understanding to others, and produce the 
mutually shared social order in which they live. Ethnomethodology is a descriptive discipline and does 
not engage in the explanation or evaluation of the particular social order undertaken as a topic of study. In 
this way it differs from other sociological perspectives.  
Garfinkel was influenced by phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and Alfred Schutz who used it 
in interpretive sociology. Garfinkel's particular aim was to show that social order was locally produced - 
"just this way by just these participants" and only their understandings matter. Common sense is 
biographical - in seeing the social world as stable as experience of it has developed over time from the 
individual's point of view. A reciprocity of perspectives and suspension of doubt is assumed by social 
actors. 
The view of Schutz was that whereas scientists know so much of the world is not as it commonly 
appears, ordinary people assume that things are as they appear and that others as well as themselves will 
behave accordingly according to a stock of knowledge already laid down. For Garfinkel too there were 
two recommendations that the social settings were already practically acomplished and that people were 
practical enquirers. The practicality means people do not separate the action and the explanation: they are 
intertwined. Nor is there any covert motivation to be uncovered by sociologists, as the action is the 
meaning as involved. Schutz saw that there are different rationalities, and in this he follows Weber. Not 
unlike Weber, scientific rationality leads to anomie, here because it undermines the given stock of 
knowledge and assumptions of reciprocity between people. Certainly sociologists should not try to 
impose a science of sociology on to the world, though this is because it misses meanings and because 
meanings and the social world as well as derived actions are intricately connected: the social world 
produces meanings and is created by these meanings. Margaret Mead spoke of a world taken for granted, 
and that people assume realities until something comes along to question them. 
Garfinkel's approach is conservative, because indexicality relies on established guiding 
interpretations at an almost unconscious level: so how do these change? Garfinkel forces new experiences 
into old interpretations, whereas even ordinary people can weigh up and reinterpret new experiences. 
Perhaps people knowingly assess their documentary evidences either to maintain or change their 
interpretive experiences, rather than trying to adapt everything into preforms of practically understood 
almost unconsciously accepted everyday interpretations. Culture does change, for example, so shifts are 
made. This is not unlike Kuhn's paradigm shift that scientists in the pursuit of falsification can undergo as 
new evidence calls for new interpretation. 
Garfinkel’s development of phenomenological tradition is widely misunderstood. In contrast to 
the social constructionist version of phenomenological sociology, he emphasises a focus on radical 
phenomena, rather than on the various ways they are interpreted. His recommendation that sociologists 
suspend their assumption of social order is often wrongly taken to mean that he believes social life to be 
chaotic, or that members of society are free agents. However, this suspension (bracketing in the 
phenomenological jargon) is merely an analytic move designed to bring the existing social order more 
clearly into focus. He emphasises the indexicality of language and the difficulties this creates for the 
production of objective accounts of social phenomena. This means that such accounts are reflexive to the 
settings in which they are produced (they depend upon that setting for their meaning). 
Ethnomethodology looks at how individuals communicate while interacting. One of its key points 
is that ethnomethods are reflexive accounts. These accounts are the ways in which actors do such things 
as describe, criticize, and idealize specific situations to make sense of their social world. Reality is not 
stable. Garfinkel and other ethnomethodologists did not subscribe to Parsons’ theory that the social world 
is reified. Ethnomethodology treats social facts as the result of the individual situation created by a 
specific situation involving interpersonal communication. That is why many enthnomethodologists were 
concerned with the analysis of conversation. 
Garfinkel believed experiences provided the meaning of language and facilitated communication. 
He did not believe language held a shared, consistent meaning for everyone. Garfinkel contended that the 
words of language are not the basis of communication. Previous and present interactions are at the heart 
of communicating. 
According to Garfinkel, communication is made possible by a communal agreement or the 
appearance of consensus of the spoken word. Previously agreed upon events, within conversation, can set 
patterns of understanding. These patterns of previous communication are brought to encounters by each 
participant and can only be understood if each person met with the same results during previous dialogues 
with others. Communication produces experiences that are recalled in future communication. The more 
experience one has through conversing the greater understanding in communicating can be achieved. 
Understandings are developed through the interaction of communicating. The words of a language do not 
hold any inherit, common meaning. Conversations can be very vague. Social interaction provides the 
understanding. 
In terms of the question of ethnomethodological methods, it is the position of Anne Rawls, 
speaking for Garfinkel, that ethnomethodology is itself not a method. That is, it does not have a set of 
formal reseach methods or procedures. Instead, the position taken is that ethnomethodologists have 
conducted their studies in a variety of ways, and that the point of these investigations is, «to discover the 
things that persons in particular situations do, the methods they use, to create the patterned orderliness of 
social life».  
Working out the totals it is necessary to stress, Garfinkel and other ethnomethodologists see 
language as a tool that is used to interpret and clarify social interactions. The interaction is doing the 
communicating and language the clarifying. Progressive realization through communication, past and 
present, further facilitates the understanding of language and its use. Communication is possible through 
social interaction and the development of the consensus of an assumed shared meaning based on 
experience. 
 
